Abstract
Introduction
The key to generating testing scenarios through environment behavior models is defining an event trace, which is a set of detectable actions in the environment that are relevant to the operation of the system under test (SUT) [1] . Two basic relations are defined for events: precedence and inclusion. Precedence defines partial ordering of events; two events may occur concurrently if they are not under the ordering relation. The use of inclusion allows for one event to appear inside another event. In addition, randomized decisions, which affect the occurrence of a set of events and the number of times to perform a given iteration, are defined through assigning probabilities to events.
The structure of possible event traces can be specified through the following event grammar: identifiers stand for event types, sequence denotes precedence of events, (…|…) denotes alternative, * means repetition zero or more times of ordered events, {a, b} denotes a set of two events a and b without an ordering relation between them, and {…}* denotes a set of zero or more events without an ordering relation between them. The rule A::= B C means that an event of the type A contains (IN relation) ordered events of types B and C correspondingly (PRECEDES relation). The following example demonstrate how event grammar can be used to define event traces: The rule for OfficeAlarmSystem defines it as a set of two concurrent monitoring threads. The rule for DoorMonitoring declares it as a composite event, which contains a sequence of ordered events of the type DoorSensor. The rule for the DoorSensor event specifies that it may contain one of two possible alternatives. The rules for WindowMonitoring and WindowSensor parallel the specifications of DoorSensor and DoorMonitoring. Thus, event grammar is used to define a set of possible event traces to model a certain environment. The purpose is to use it as a production grammar for random event trace generation by traversing grammar rules and making random selections of alternatives and number of repetitions. An event may have attributes associated with it. Each event type may have a different attribute set. Event grammar rules 1-4244-0188-7/06/$20.00 ©2006 IEEE can be decorated with attribute evaluation rules. The /action/ is performed immediately after the preceding event is completed.
The use of environment behavior models as a tool for scenario generation and testing automation has several advantages. AEG is effective for modeling dynamic environments because it allows for the definition of a broad range of scenarios through a relatively simple framework. By defining a set of events with a few basic attributes and probabilities, a large number of pseudo-random scenarios, with ordered and concurrent events, may be generated. Furthermore, environment behavior models allow for adaptive test cases, in which upcoming events in the scenario are dependent on the current output sequence of the SUT; this is enabled through the sending of messages between the environment model and the SUT. Different testing scenarios can be generated for different purposes using the same environment model. For example, by adjusting the probabilities of certain hazardous events, extreme-case scenarios can be generated for load testing. While state machines and other similar methods are suitable for modeling static environments with fixed scenarios and a predetermined number of explicitly defined states, we believe that AEG environment behavior models are more effective for specifying dynamic, real-world environments.
In this paper we present case studies to demonstrate how effective this method is in assessing and improving software system safety. This is done through implementation with an actual real-time, reactive system. The computer-assisted resuscitation algorithm (CARA) was developed by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research to improve life support for trauma cases and military casualties [2] . This algorithm monitors a patient's blood pressure and controls a high-output patient resuscitation infusion pump. A model incorporating the primary behavior of CARA was chosen as the SUT because it is a safetycritical, software-intensive system that operates in an environment with hazardous events. This paper discusses the design of our environment model and its interaction with the CARA control software model, the actual software implementation of this design, and results and analysis from running simulations.
Design
The primary functions of the CARA control software are monitoring a patient's blood pressure, controlling a high-output patient resuscitation pump, and alarming a human caregiver during emergency situations [2] . In order to test the aforementioned safety-critical functions, we incorporated the following components into our environment model in order to emulate CARA's operating conditions:
Patient-The patient's current blood pressure, which is the primary indicator of the patient's condition in this model, is calculated by taking the current bleeding rate and resuscitation pump parameters into account. A starting blood pressure is randomly assigned to the patient within a range specified before each simulation run. In addition, the patient's bleeding rate can change from a moderate state to a hemorrhage state based on a defined probability. This probability can be increased to see how well the CARA control software reacts to more severe conditions. If the patient's blood pressure stays below a particular threshold for a given amount of time, a death state is declared.
Human Caregiver-During emergency conditions, CARA raises a low blood pressure alarm that signals the need for attention from a human caregiver. The human caregiver can potentially stabilize the patient, which is simulated by reducing the patient's bleeding rate. The probability of stabilization and time needed to stabilize can be modified, which potentially shows how CARA's effectiveness corresponds to the ability of the human caregiver to give immediate medical care. For example, it may be found that CARA has a high failure rate if the caregiver is unable to stabilize the patient within a certain period of time. This is just one example of how an environment behavior model can give useful insight into how the effectiveness of the SUT correlates to environmental factors. Furthermore, this is also an example of how the environment model utilizes adaptive test cases because it changes its behavior based on receiving an alarm from the SUT. Pending successful stabilization, the human caregiver resets CARA into an auto control mode. The other task of the human caregiver is to clear occlusions in the resuscitation pump.
Resuscitation Pump-The CARA control software controls the patient resuscitation pump by specifying an operating voltage. This voltage drives the pump at a particular rotation rate, which in turn determines the intravenous (IV) flow rate. One of the major hazards associated with the resuscitation pump is the possibility of occlusions. If an occlusion occurs, CARA halts operation. At this point, the occlusion must be cleared and CARA must be reset. This is an undesired event because the patient does not receive direct medical care during this period of time. The probability of an occlusion occurring and the probability that the human caregiver is able to clear the occlusion are both adjustable.
Stretcher Instrumentation-This simple component of the environment monitors and reports the patient's blood pressure at regular intervals. The CARA control software uses the blood pressure readings.
All of these environment components can be implemented as concurrent threads of events using AEG [1] . These threads are then iterated at a reasonable periodic rate, such as 1 second. Key features captured by the design of this environment behavior model are risk, adaptation, and modifiability. Risk is defined as a function of the possible frequency of occurrence of an undesired event [3] , and is enabled in this model through adjustable probabilities of various hazards. Adaptation is enabled through the reaction of the model to the output signals of the SUT. It is also important to note that this same model can be used to generate a broad range of scenarios. For example, an extreme case scenario can be created by setting high probabilities of hemorrhaging and occlusions. Or if we wanted to see how well CARA operated with less competent human caregivers, we can set a scenario with a low probability of patient stabilization upon experiencing a low blood pressure emergency. Figure 1 shows the messaging needed for successful interaction between CARA and the environment model. The powerOn, plugIn, stopControl, and startControl messages are sent to reset CARA into an auto-control state following the clearing of an occlusion or after successful stabilization. The emfEvent and bpEvent messages report the current state of the pump and patient, while the occlusion message reports the occurrence and clearing of an occlusion. CARA's calculated pump control voltage is sent via the pumpVoltage message, and the lowBPAlarm message is sent upon detection of low blood pressure.
Implementation
The environment behavior model is specified in an AEG file that defines the attributes and behavior of each environment component through a concurrent thread of events. This file is then compiled into a C++ file using a compiler written in the Rigal language [4] . This C++ file contains a sequence of statements that correspond to timestamped events, which span a specified simulation run length. Which pseudo-random events, such as hazards, are actually executed during run time depends on specified probabilities. The following segment of AEG code specifies one part of the Patient event thread behavior and demonstrates several key features of the environment behavior model: The catch construct allows for adaptation by executing the code directly following it only if the environment model receives a lowBPAlarm message from CARA. At this point, the environment registers that the patient is in a critical, low blood pressure state. The human caregiver then attempts to stabilize the patient. In the given sample code there is a 60% chance of stabilization. This probablility is modifiable within the range of [0-100] and can be set according to the type of scenario we wish to generate. Pending successful stabilization, the environment registers that the patient is no longer in a low blood pressure state and the caregiver takes the necessary steps to reset CARA into an auto-control state. Additional semantics of AEG and its many other features are described in [1] and will not be discussed here.
Our CARA control software model was implemented in C++ as a finite state machine. This state machine reacts to messages sent by the environment. For example, an occlusion message triggers CARA into an auto-fail state, where it remains until reset into auto-control through the messages displayed in the above code sample. While CARA is in auto-control, it supplies a control voltage to the resuscitation pump in the environment model once every clock cycle.
Our simulations were run using the OMNeT++ simulation platform [5] . OMNeT++ creates a simulated real-time environment that allows for multiple events to occur concurrently. In OMNeT++, CARA and the environment model are defined as modules. Messages between these modules are sent across predefined channels. When a module receives a message, it is kept within a buffer, which is what enables multiple messages to be sent simultaneously. OMNeT++ offers a visual display that allows the user to observe real-time execution of the simulation as messages are sent between modules and the output of each module is logged. Multiple simulations were executed through a batch file process. Scenarios can be both created and run within the batch process. Our batch files also gave the option of running existing scenarios and creating new sets of scenarios for later use. The key advantage to segmenting the creation and execution of scenarios is the ability to change simulation parameters before the same set of scenarios is run. This allows one to isolate the impact of specific environmental variables, such as the starting blood pressure of the patient. Relevant statistics were logged during these simulation runs and analyzed using MATLAB script files.
Results
The following case studies were conducted when we explored the effectiveness of the environment behavior model as a tool to test and improve the CARA control software model. Our case studies can be broken into three different categories: quantitative safety assessment, qualitative safety assessment, and development of the SUT. For all of these case studies, the following simulation parameters were used: 
Quantitative Safety Assessment
Quantitative safety assessment is based on the idea that by running a large number of test scenarios, we can gather relevant statistics that give insight into the effectiveness of the SUT with respect to environmental variables and hazards. For this case study we generated and ran 1000 simulation trials. The results from these trials are given in Table 1 . From such results, we can better understand which factors lead to failure of the SUT and in what way. In this case, it is evident that there is a positive correlation between average number of occlusions and death scenarios, and a negative correlation between starting BP and death scenarios. From further analysis we may even be able to determine which of these factors plays a more significant role in leading to failure of the SUT.
Qualitative Safety Assessment
Evaluation of qualitative safety assessment involves observing unexpected or unsafe behavior, especially when the SUT is subjected to a series of hazardous events. This type of analysis is especially useful for eliminating errors in control software when hazardous events occur concurrently or very closely in time. This case study arose because we recognized that in some cases CARA would continue to operate the patient resuscitation pump even after the death of the patient. After closer inspection, it became evident that this error occurred when an occlusion was cleared close to the time of death. In this case, CARA's message buffer would still have commands to reset into auto-control mode at the point that it was notified of the patient's death. Such an error would be extremely difficult to find in real-world testing due to the rarity of the situation. In addition, this is not a test case that is easily thought of when explicitly writing software test cases for the SUT. This type of error can be more easily caught with the environment behavior model because it is able to quickly generate a large number of extreme case scenarios, with high probabilities of particular hazards occurring with close temporal proximity.
Development/Improvement of the SUT
This case study demonstrates how environment behavior models can be used to develop the SUT through serving as a testbed to compare variations of key algorithms. We show that this process can even lead to better algorithms. Environment behavior models are useful for this purpose because each algorithm variation can be subjected to the same scenario batch, which perhaps targets a particular set of hazardous events. In this case study we explored variations of CARA's voltage calculation algorithm, which is the algorithm that determines the control voltage for the patient resuscitation pump. The first variation was a static algorithm that changed its behavior based on the patient's diastolic blood pressure: If the blood pressure is above the desired target level (coasting region), this algorithm outputs a minimum voltage that is just enough to keep the resuscitation pump infusion line open. If the blood pressure is in the critical region, the algorithm applies maximum voltage. In the normal operating region, the algorithm outputs a voltage that is proportional to how far the patient's blood pressure is from the desired blood pressure level. The second variation of the voltage calculation algorithm calculated the patient's blood loss rate from the most recent blood pressure readings. This Figure  2 . The graph at the left shows the number of stabilizations achieved by each algorithm and the graph at the right shows the number of deaths when each algorithm was used.
Stabilizations are defined as bringing the patient within a close tolerance of the desired blood pressure by the end of the simulation trial. Although the blood loss rate algorithm led to more stabilizations, it also allowed significantly more deaths. These results led to the insight that perhaps a hybrid algorithm combining the better features of these two algorithms could improve the effectiveness of the SUT.
This hybrid algorithm is illustrated in Figure 3 . It is based on the idea that if the patient's diastolic blood pressure is within the normal operating region, the blood loss rate algorithm does a better job of stabilizing the patient. On the other hand, in the critical region it is better to take the static algorithm's policy of applying maximum voltage, regardless of the blood loss rate. The results from running the same 1000 scenario batch with this hybrid algorithm are shown in Figure 4 . It is clear that the new hybrid algorithm takes advantage of the best features of the initial two algorithms by achieving the same number of stabilizations as the blood loss rate algorithm, while allowing the same number of deaths as the static algorithm. Thus, in this case it is clear that the use of the environment behavior model led to insights that inspired a better algorithm.
Relevance to Systems-of-Systems
Our AEG-based approach to testing and safety analysis can be applied to systems-of-systems. As systems are plugged into or pulled out of a system-of-systems, such as composing CARA with other patient-monitoring systems, the AEG environment behavior models can be reused to assess the emergent behaviors of the resulting system-of-systems. The approach can also be used to assess the behavior of different configurations in which a system-of-systems may operate, which is of particular interest for systems-of-systems that support reconfiguration at runtime.
Conclusion
Using AEG, we designed and implemented an environment behavior model for a real-time, reactive system. This system was a model of the CARA control software, which is a safety-critical, software-intensive system that operates within a hazardous environment. We conducted case studies in which our environment behavior model interacted with CARA under specified simulation parameters. These case studies have shown that environment behavior models can be valuable assets that are reusable for several purposes. Not only can they be used as effective tools for quantitative and qualitative safety assessment, they can also be used as a platform for improving key algorithms in the SUT. Static Algorithm
Blood Loss Rate Algorithm Figure 3 . Illustration of the hybrid algorithm inspired by initial results
